Election Glitches:
The Secret Dangers of Electronic Voting Machines
Introduction
Welcome to California Connected's in-depth reporting on the security hole found in Diebold Election Systems' popular touch-screen voting units, which are used in several counties throughout the country.
Excavating key minutiae without getting lost in details, we have tried to tackle the issue in three different ways, looking at: What we know about the security threat, how governmental oversight has worked or failed, and how language and technical knowledge are essential to the debate.
Besides our special series of articles, you will also find links to a Web interactive, extended audio interviews, and several online resources.
Articles
"Shortcircuits in our democracy?" is an introduction to our article series.
"Backdoors to Castle Diebold" describes how the security hole was found and how a potential attack could occur.
"Voting machines and hailstorms" considers whether federal oversight mechanisms are broken or insufficient.
"Two sides speaking in code" examines the critical role of language in what is a complex, technological problem.
Interactive
Ballot Boxes and Black Holes: A Web interactive that explores the Diebold security problem, the importance of voter verified paper ballots and the conflicting pressures counties face in adopting electronic voting technologies.
Interviews with sources
Susan Lapsley, California Assistant Secretary of State for Elections, oversees the state certification program for voting machines. She discusses the federal, state and county process of testing and monitoring elections equipment.
Barbara Dunmore, Registrar of Voters for Riverside County, works in one of the first jurisdictions in California to fully adopt touch-screen voting systems. She discusses the administrative process in place to physically secure several hundred machines on election day.
Elaine Ginnold, Registrar of Voters for Marin County, worked previously in Alameda County, where an important lawsuit was filed against Diebold Election Systems under the state's False Claims Act. She discusses the encrypted memory cards as well as the bidding process for voting equipment contracts.
Douglas Jones, an associate professor of computer science at the University of Iowa, is recognized as one of the nation's top experts on voting systems. He discusses the security hole and what he sees as an improperly regulated industry.
Joseph Lorenzo Hall, a Ph.D. student working under the auspices of A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections (ACCURATE), discusses the policy implications of the Diebold security hole.
Lowell Finley, Co-Director of Voter Action, a voter rights group that has helped bring several injunction lawsuits against electronic voting systems. He discusses the concerns activists have about these new technologies and how the legal process has helped shape more transparent elections.
Kim Alexander, President of the California Voter Foundation, was a key proponent of California's Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail law and an expert in election policy. She discusses the lack of transparency in the federal testing program and what vulnerabilities voters can't afford to ignore.
Paul DeGregorio, Chairman of the United States Election Assistance Commission, has more than 20 years experience in elections administration. He discusses the importance of election management and transparency while appealing to realistic expectations of our voting system.
Mark Radke, Director of Marketing for Diebold Election Systems, discusses the reliability and accuracy of Diebold voting machines compared to traditional methods. He challenges some of the evidence that has been cited in the discovery of the security hole.
Bev Harris, Director of Black Box Voting, the election watchdog group that funded the discovery of the Diebold security problem, discusses what she sees as corporate irresponsibility in the voting industry and the importance of pinning down Diebold Election Systems' master programmer.
Resources
- Harri Hursti's redacted report for Black Box Voting
- Black Box Voting, a nonpartisan, nonprofit, election watchdog organization
- Diebold Election Systems
- California Secretary of State's Voting Systems
- California Secretary of State's independent study of previous Diebold security concerns by its Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board (pdf)
- Help America Vote Act of 2002
- United States Election Assistance Commission. By the end of 2006, EAC will oversee all federal testing and certifications for electronic voting machines, as well as the development of election management, training and transparency guidelines.
- National Association of State Election Directors. NASED voluntarily oversees federal testing and certification for electronic voting machines. It will be handing over its duties to the EAC by the end of 2006.
- California Online Voter Guide, The California Voter Foundation
- Verified Voting Foundation
- ACCURATE, A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections, supported by the National Science Foundation
- Voter Action, a voter rights group that has brought important lawsuits against several states and counties concerning electronic voting systems
- UC Berkeley's Election Administration Research Center, with links to contact information for California's county election officials.
- Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
- "Not Quite a Blog", Web log by Joseph Lorenzo Hall, U.C. Berkeley Ph.D student and researcher for ACCURATE
- Voting and Elections by Douglas W. Jones, computer science professor from the University of Iowa; recognized expert on electronic voting systems.
- An illustrated history of voting by Douglas Jones
- RABA Technology's 2004 report on Diebold's electronic voting machines (pdf)
- Sequoia Voting Systems, Electronic Voting Vendor
- Election Systems & Software, Electronic Voting Vendor
- Hart Intercivic Election Solutions, Electronic Voting Vendor
- Security Risk Seen in Electronic Voting Machines, Story by Linda Wertheimer for National Public Radio's Weekend Edition, May 20, 2006
- "Will Your Vote Count in 2006?", article by Steven Levy for Newsweek, May 29, 2006
- "New security glitch found in Diebold system", article by Ian Hoffman for the Oakland Tribune, May 10, 2006
